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A QUEST FOR LAW IN A LAWLESS SUPREME 
COURT
Lino A. Graglia*
RICHARD FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (HARVARD 
UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). PP. 240. HARDCOVER $41.00. 
7KHSXUSRVHRI3URIHVVRU)DOORQ¶VERRNLVWRVKRZWKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLVERXQG
by law despite its expansive policymaking role. As he VWDWHVLQWKHERRN¶V3UHIDFH³[W]e 
QHHG WR UHFRJQL]H WKDW SROLWLFDO YLHZV ZLOO KDYH DQ LQHVFDSDEOH UROH´ LQ WKH &RXUW¶V
constitutional decisions.1 The task, therefore, is to  
develop conceptions of law in the Supreme Court, and legitimacy in judicial decision-making 
that accommodate this realization. . . . But our conceptions of law and legitimacy in the 
Supreme Court cannot be so flaccid that they would permit the Justices, with five votes, to 
do anything they might be able to get away with.2
7RVD\DVKHGRHVWKDWKLVERRNLV³DPELWLRXV´3 is an understatement, as it attempts to do, 
in an impressive display of lawyerly skill, what cannot be done: deny that the Supreme 
Court is a lawless political institution. 
The source of the problem Professor Fallon faces begins with the even more 
fundamental problem that contemporary constitutional law is a matter of delusion and 
pretense. The pretense is that the very old and very brief Constitution, written by a small 
group of men in an incomparably different environment, provides meaningful answers to 
FRQWHPSRUDU\VRFLDOSUREOHPV7KHUHVXOWLVWKDWWKH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJVRIXQFRQVWLWXWionality 
DUHQHFHVVDULO\SROLF\MXGJPHQWV&RQVWLWXWLRQDOODZLVWKHSURGXFWRI³MXGLFLDOUHYLHZ´
the power of courts²largely invented by the courts²to invalidate policy choices made 
by legislators and other officials of government on the ground that they are prohibited by 
the Constitution.4 It happens, however, that the Constitution prohibits very few policy 
choices and even fewer that American legislators might otherwise seek to adopt. The result 
is that if judicial review was in practice what it is in theory, it would be a matter of very 
limited importance, giving the Supreme Court a very limited policymaking role. 
                                                          
*A. W. Walker Centennial Chair Emeritus in Law. 
 1. RICHARD FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT xii (2018). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at ix. 
 4. Id. at 1. 
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The Constitution was adopted in 1789 to establish a national government, primarily 
for purposes of defense, finance, and commerce, not to create or protect individual rights.5
The only substantive right created was a prohibition of debtor-relief laws.6 The first Ten 
Amendments, known as the Bill of Rights, and adopted two years later, meant to apply to 
only the federal government, and primarily concerned with criminal procedure, adds two 
more substantive rights. The Second Amendment added a qualified right of the people to 
³EHDU$UPV´7 and the Fifth prohibits confiscation of property.8 Nothing better illustrates 
the limited role of the Constitution than the fact that, as a practical matter, it largely comes 
down to a single constitutional provision, the second sentence of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.9 Most constitutional cases involve state, not federal, law and nearly all of 




d’état whereby the Court converted these clauses to grants of power to invalidate any 
deprivation of liberty or any discrimination, i.e.DQ\ODZLWFRQVLGHUV³XQUHDVRQDEO>H@´11
After the application of either of these revised clauses to a case, the Constitution drops out 
RIWKHSLFWXUHOHDYLQJWKH&RXUWZLWKDSXUHSROLF\MXGJPHQW3URIHVVRU)DOORQ¶VWDVNOLNH
WKDWRIDOOQRQRULJLQDOLVWSURSRQHQWVRIWKH³OLYLQJ&RQVWLWXWLRQ´12 is to deny or obscure 
WKLVUHDOLW\DQGJLYHWKH&RXUW¶VUXOLQJRIXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\³OHJLWLPDF\´13 by showing 
that the Justices are in some way limited by the Constitution. 
3URIHVVRU)DOORQ¶VERRNFDQEH VHHQDVD UHVSRQVH WRDZHOO-known statement by 
-XVWLFH:LOOLDP-%UHQQDQWKDW)DOORQTXRWHVLQKLVSUHIDFH³:LWKILYHYRWHV\RXFDQGR
DQ\WKLQJ´14 ³%UHQQDQZDVZURQJ´)DOORQVD\VDV³WKHUHDUHVRPHWKLQJV²indeed, many 
things²WKDWWKH-XVWLFHVFDQQRWGRHYHQZLWKILYHYRWHV´15 Later in the book, he quotes 
the also well-known statement of Charles Evans Hughes, later a Chief Justice of the United 
                                                          
 5. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 512 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (³[B]ills of rights 
are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects . . . . [T]hey have no application to constitutions, 
professedly founded upon the power of the people and executed by their immediate representatives and 
servants.´). 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (³No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.´). 
The history of the provisions demonstrates why constitutional restrictions on policy choices should not be 
favored. Human life and society are too various to admit of absolute principles. See Home Building & Loan 
Ass¶n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (finding it necessary to virtually read this section out of the Constitution 
to allow Minnesota to provide some relief to indebted farmers during the Great Depression). 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. II (³A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right 
of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.´). 
 8. U.S. CONST. amend. V (³[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.´). 
 9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (³No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.´). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Lino A. Graglia, Creative Constitutional Interpretation as Justification for Rule by the Supreme 
Court, 51 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 109, 116±17 (2019). 
 12. Id. at 110. 
 13. FALLON, supra note 1, at x. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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6WDWHV6XSUHPH&RXUWWRWKHVDPHHIIHFW³WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQLVZKDWWKHMXGJHVVD\LWLV´16
7KLVZRXOGEHWUXH)DOORQDGPLWV³>L@IWKHUHLVQRZD\WR enforce the Constitution against 
WKH-XVWLFHVDQGLIWKH\DUHWKXVSUDFWLFDOO\XQFRQVWUDLQHG´17 The Justices are, however, 
KH DUJXHV VXEMHFW WR SUDFWLFDO UHVWUDLQWV ERWK ³H[WHUQDO´ ³LPSRVHG E\ RWKHUV´ DQG
³QRUPDWLYH´³VWDQGDUGVWRZKLFKRIILFLDOVRXJKWWRFRQIRUP´18 They are constrained by 





team four strikes per batter or four outs per iQQLQJ´20 'RLQJ WKDWZRXOGEH WR ³VWHS>@
outside the role of an umpire in a baseball game as defined by broadly shared 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRIWKHUXOHVWKDWPDNHEDVHEDOOEDVHEDOO´21 Similarly, the Court could not, 
IRUH[DPSOH³RUGHU>@WKHDUP\WRLQYDGH,UDQ´22 The rules of baseball, however, are clear, 
specific, and enforceable; the rules of constitutional lawmaking by the Supreme Court, if 
any, are uncertain and unsanctioned, and, unlike the umpire, the Court decides the case. 
7KH&RXUW¶VFUHDWLRQRIDconstitutional right to have an abortion, for example, seems a 
clear case of it successfully stepping out of the judicial role and into the legislative role, 
HYHQLILWFDQ¶WRUGHUWKHLQYDVLRQRI,UDQ
Turning to external restraints, Professor Fallon points out that each Justice is 
³FRQVWUDLQHGLQGLYLGXDOO\E\WKHQHHGWRVHFXUHWKHDJUHHPHQWRIDWOHDVWIRXUFROOHDJXHV
LQRUGHUWRUHQGHUOHJDOO\HIILFDFLRXVMXGJPHQWV´23 which seems more to affirm than to 
GLVSXWH-XVWLFH%UHQQDQ¶VVWDWHPHQW$QRWKHUSRWHQWial external constraint, Fallon argues, 
LVWKDWWKH³&RQVWLWXWLRQHPSRZHUV&RQJUHVVDQGWKHSUHVLGHQWWRLPSRVHVDQFWLRQVRQWKH
Supreme Court and its Justices if they deviate from what Congress and the president take 
WREHWKH&RQVWLWXWLRQ¶VGLFWDWHV´24 He does not, however, specify the source or the nature 
of these sanctions or give any example of their being used. The only sanctions for judicial 
misbehavior provided for in the Constitution are impeachment and removal from office 
IRU³KLJK&ULPHVDQG0LVGHPHDQRUV´25 and abuse of judicial power is not considered a 
crime. Only one Justice was ever impeached, and he was not convicted, causing President 
-HIIHUVRQWRGHQRXQFHLPSHDFKPHQWDV³QRWHYHQDVFDUH-FURZ´26
A potentially significant constraint on the Court mentioned by Fallon is the power 
RI&RQJUHVVWROLPLWE\VWDWXWHWKH&RXUW¶VDSSHOODWHMXULVGLFWLRQEXWIRUYDULRXVUHDVRQV
including that the Court gets to pass on the validity of the statute, it has rarely been used. 
                                                          
 16. Id. at 105. 
 17. Id.
 18. FALLON, supra note 1, at 105. 
 19. Id. at 107. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 108. 
 23. FALLON, supra note 1, at 109. 
 24. Id. at 110. 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
 26. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 12 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 
15th ed. 2004). 
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Fallon finds it useful to mentLRQ WKDW WKH-XVWLFHV³DUHDOVRVXEMHFW WR WKHFULPLQDO ODZ
LQFOXGLQJLWVSURKLELWLRQVDJDLQVWEULEHU\DQGH[WRUWLRQ´27 As another external constraint, 
)DOORQQRWHVWKDW3UHVLGHQW)UDQNOLQ5RRVHYHOWSURSRVHG³SDFNLQJ´WKH&RXUWE\DGGLQJ
some friendly Justices, but the proposal was almost uniformly denounced as improper and 
ZDVGHIHDWHGDIWHUD³VZLWFK´E\WKH&RXUWPDGHLWXQQHFHVVDU\28
³3HUKDSVWKHPRVWSUDFWLFDOO\LPSRUWDQWFRQVWUDLQWRQWKH-XVWLFHV´3URIHVVRU)DOORQ
VWDWHVLV³WKHSURVSHFWWKDWVRPH decisions they might imaginably render would be treated 
DVQXOOLWLHV RU RWKHUZLVHSURYH LQHIILFDFLRXV´29 Fallon gives as examples the Marshall 
&RXUW¶VUHIXVDOWRLQYDOLGDWHDVWDWXWHWKDWUHPRYHGVL[WHHQ)HGHUDOLVWMXGJHVDSSRLQWHGIRU
life, as the Constitution provides, from office by abolishing their offices, and its refusal to 
LVVXH DQ RUGHU WR WKH -HIIHUVRQ DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ ZKHQ IDFHG ZLWK ³D FUHGLEOH WKUHDW RI
GHILDQFH´LQMarbury v. Madison.30 These decisions, Fallon is correct, might well have 
been influenced by prudence given the weak and vulnerable position of the Court in its 
earliest days, but that is not its position today. He mentions as further examples of 
QXOOLILFDWLRQ3UHVLGHQW/LQFROQ¶VUHIXVDOGXULQJWKHHDUO\GD\VRIWKH&LYLO:DUWRREH\Dn
RUGHUE\&KLHI-XVWLFH7DQH\WRIUHHDQDOOHJHG&RQIHGHUDWHFROODERUDWRUDQGWKH&RXUW¶V
decision to allow military trials and summary executions of alleged Nazi saboteurs after 
3UHVLGHQW 5RRVHYHOW ³PDGH LW NQRZQ´ WKDW KH ZRXOG QRW REH\ D FRQWUDU\ GHFLVion.31
Finally, he argues that the Court did not order immediate desegregation in Brown v. Board 
of Education EHFDXVH ³LW NQHZ WKDW DPDQGDWH RI LPPHGLDWHGHVHJUHJDWLRQPLJKWKDYH
SURYHGLQHIILFDFLRXV´32 Exercise of caution in a truly revolutionary decision would not be 
surprising, but the Court was faced not only with possible defiance by southern school 
districts but more importantly with the fact that the districts could and would effectively 
and legally avoid desegregation by simply closing the public schools. 
7XUQLQJWRWKHDOOHJHG³3ROLWLFDOO\&RQVWUXFWHG%RXQGVRI-XGLFLDO3RZHU´3URIHVVRU
Fallon argues that Congress permits the Court to have the last word on social policy issues 
RQO\LILWVGHFLVLRQV³UHPDLQZLWKLQWKHERXQGVRISROLWLFDODQGSUDFWLFDOWROHUDELOLW\´33 It 
LVQRGRXEWWUXHEXWDOPRVWWDXWRORJLFDOWKDW³GHFLVLRQVWKDWSURYRNHVXIILFLHQWO\EURDGDQG
HQGXULQJ SXEOLF RXWUDJH ZLOO QRW VXUYLYH´34 In place of examples of these supposed 
constraints, Fallon resorts to the canard, favored by defenders of judicial power, that the 
&RXUW³KDVQHYHU VWUD\HGYHU\ IDU IRUYHU\ ORQJ IURPPDLQVWUHDPSXEOLFRSLQLRQ´35 In 
fact, there is little that Congress or the people can do about unwanted constitutional 
decisions as is illustrated by the fact that none of the often-detested revolutionary decisions 
of the Warren and Burger Courts have ever been overturned. 
)LQDOO\ 3URIHVVRU )DOORQ DUJXHV WKDW WKH -XVWLFHV DUH VXEMHFW WR ³>Q@RUPDWLYH
FRQVWUDLQWV´7KH-XVWLFHVKHWKLQNV³XQGHUVWDQGWKHPVHOYHVDVVXEMHFW to legal obligations 
                                                          
 27. FALLON, supra note 1, at 110. 
 28. Id. at 111. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 113. 
 31. Id.
 32. FALLON, supra note 1, at 110. 
 33. Id. at 114±15. 
 34. Id. at 116. 
 35. Id. at 11; see generally Justin Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 929 (2014). 
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DVZHOO DV SROLWLFDO FRQVWUDLQWV´ DQG WKH\ WDNH WKHP ³VHULRXVO\´36 He does not tell us, 
KRZHYHUZKDWWKH\DUHRUKRZWKH\FRQVWUDLQ+HUHMHFWVWKHYLHZRI³QRUPVNHSWLFDO´
SROLWLFDOVFLHQWLVWVWKDWVXJJHVWWKH³-XVWLFHVFRQVLVWHQWO\ vote to decide cases in ways that 
GLUHFWO\ UHIOHFW WKHLU LGHRORJLFDO YDOXHV´ EHFDXVH WKH VNHSWLcs wrongly assume that 
ideology ³PXVW DOZD\V GRPLQDWH DOO RWKHU FRQVLGHUDWLRQV´37 The fact that the Justices 
disagree on ideological grounds does not mean, he VD\VWKDWWKH\³GRQRWIHHOQRUPDWLYHO\
FRQVWUDLQHG E\ WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ DQG DSSOLFDEOH LQWHUSUHWLYH QRUPV´38 It does show, 
however, that their decisions are ideologically based. 
Professor Fallon next turns to the favorite topic of constitutional scholars, theories 
RIFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ$OWKRXJKWKH-XVWLFHVDUHKHDUJXHV³PHDQLQJIXOO\ERXQG
E\ODZ´WKH³UHOHYDQWOHJDODXWKRULWLHVDUHRIWHQLQGHWHUPLQDWH´SUHVHQWLQJWKH-XVWLFHV
ZLWK WKH SUREOHP RI KRZ WR ³VHWWOH FRQVWLWXWLRQDO LVVXHV FRUUHFWO\´39 As far as 
constitutional law is concerned, however, the relevant legal authorities²the 
Constitution²are very few, and mostly determinate. To the extent that they are 
indeterminate²probably because the Court has made them so²they should not present 
the Court with a constitutional problem. If a legislatively enacted policy choice is not 
clearly prohibited by the Constitution, the only conclusion consistent with the theory of 
judicial review is that it is not unconstitutional²³FOHDUO\´EHFDXVH LQDGHPRcracy, the 
legislative choice should prevail in cases of doubt. Further, constitutional issues are almost 
DOZD\V SROLF\ LVVXHV WKDW GR QRW KDYH D VLQJOH ³FRUUHFW´ DQVZHU$ SROLF\ LVVXH DULVHV
because interests recognized as legitimate come into conflict, which can be resolved only 
by making a policy choice, a trade-off, not by empirical investigation or logical analysis. 
Marches and street demonstrations, for example, may be valuable means of political 
expressions, but it is also important that the streets can be sometimes used as streets. The 
only question to be decided by a Supreme Court Justice faced with a challenge of a 
regulation of street demonstrations is the extent to which he or she is willing to override 
the legislative choice. 
Constitutional interpretation should not be a mysterious subject. The Constitution 
VKRXOGSUHVXPDEO\EHLQWHUSUHWHGOLNHDQ\RWKHUZULWWHQGRFXPHQWWRUHFHLYHWKHDXWKRU¶V
message assuming that it is written in a known language with words used in their 
conventional sense. It has a fixed meaning dependent upon the intent of the author or, in 




misleading metaphor; short of constitutional amendment, the words of the Constitution do 
QRWFKDQJHLWLVRQO\WKH-XVWLFHVZKRDSSO\WKHPWKDWGRWKH³OLYLQJ´40 By giving the 
words new meaning, they effectively rewrite the Constitution. The purpose and effect of 
the metaphor is to make judicial performance of the legislative function appear to be 
                                                          
 36. FALLON, supra note 1, at 120. 
 37. Id. at 121±22. 
 38. Id. at 123. 
 39. Id. at 125. 
 40. Id. at 23, 134. 
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performance of the judicial function. Arguing that the Constitution need not necessarily 
mean what it was intended or understood to mean presents living constitutionalists with 
the problem of what, then, it does mean, of what is its alternative source of meaning. The 
apparent conclusion that it can then mean anything the so-called interpreter wants it to 
mean must be denied by proponents of the living Constitution because that would make 
the Constitution even more obviously irrelevant. 
Professor Fallon begins his discussion of theories of constitutional interpretation 
ZLWKDVWDWHPHQWWKDWLVHVVHQWLDOO\WKHRULJLQDOLVWSRVLWLRQWKDW³FRXUWVVKRXOGLQYDOLGDWH
statutes only in cases of plain uQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOLW\ UHIOHFWLQJ µa clear mistake,¶´ ZKLFK
³HPSKDVL]HV WKH OHJDO DQG PRUDO VLJQLILFDQFH RI GHFLVLRQ-making by democratically 
DFFRXQWDEOH ODZPDNHUV´41 He rejects this position, however, in favor of a number of 
living Constitution theories that he finds more acceptable. He endorses, for example, 
3URIHVVRU'DYLG6WUDXVV¶WKHRU\WKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWVKRXOGGHFLGHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFDVHV
as a common law court, free to make changes in the law. The difficulty with this is, of 
course, that common law, but not constitutional decisions, are legislatively revisable by 
ordinary statute. Professor Strauss objects to originalism, incredibly, on the ground that it 
³ZRXOGXQIDLUO\SULYLOHJHWKHYLHZVRISHRSOHZKROLYHGORQJDJRRYHUWKHMXGJPHQWVRI
WKRVH OLYLQJ WRGD\´42 which is true but is not an objection to originalism but to 
constitutionalism. It is a good reason to disfavor adopting constitutional restrictions, but 
not to create new ones or ignore the ones we have. Fallon also praises Professor Philip 
%REELWW¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKH&RXUWGHFLGHFRQVWitutional cases on the basis of a number of 
³PRGDOLWLHV´LQFOXGLQJWH[WXDOKLVWRULFDODQGVWUXFWXUDO:KHQWKHVHPRGDOLWLHVFRPHLQWR
FRQIOLFWDVWKH\VXUHO\PXVW%REELWWUHFRPPHQGVGHFLGLQJRQWKHEDVLVRI³FRQVFLHQFH´43
That these so-called alternative methods of interpretation are in practical effect 
prescriptions for unconstrained judicial policymaking seems too clear for dispute. 
3URSRQHQWV RI ³LQWHUSUHWLYH PHWKRGRORJLHV´ VKRXOG VHHN DQ DSSURDFK 3URIHVVRU
)DOORQ DUJXHV WKDW ³ZRXOG DGYDQFH HVWDEOLVK RU HQVXUH MXGLFLDO OHJLWLPDF\´44
³$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH VWDQGDUG PRGHO´ KH VWDWHV ³-XVWLFHV  . . would ideally adopt a 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDO WKHRU\ EHIRUH DVFHQGLQJ WR WKH EHQFK´ DQG WKHQ ³DSSO\ WKDW WKHRU\
FRQVLVWHQWO\ WRGHFLGH WKHFDVHV´ZKLFKZRXOG³SUHFlude unprincipled, outcome-driven 
adjudication in which the Justices experience no real methodological discipline and vote 
for . .  LGHRORJLFDOO\FRQJHQLDO´ UHVXOWV45 Fallon rejects this approach, however, as too 
rigid. He also rejects the view of some poOLWLFDO VFLHQWLVWV WKDW ³GHEXQN GHEDWHV DERXW
LQWHUSUHWLYHPHWKRGRORJ\DVDQDFDGHPLFSUHWHQVLRQ´RIQRSUDFWLFDOHIIHFWEXWKHILQGV
WKDW WKH ³OHDGLQJ´ WKHRULHV DOVR KDYH ³OLPLWDWLRQV´46 +H UHFRPPHQGV ³5HIOHFWLYH
(TXLOLEULXP7KHRU\´47 as a better approach which he borrows from moral philosopher 
John Rawls. Rawls argued that moral reasoning involves two-way traffic between our 
provisional judgments about particular cases and our over-arching moral principles. The 
                                                          
 41. FALLON, supra note 1, at 134. 
 42. Id. at 135. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 125±26. 
 45. Id. at 126. 
 46. FALLON, supra note 1, at 136. 
 47. Id. at 148. 
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Supreme Court, Fallon argues, should decide constitutional cases by similarly attempting 
WR³EULQJRXUFDVH-specific judgments into alignment with our principles, and vice versa, 
>LQ@ D TXHVW IRU µUHIOHFWLYH HTXLOLEULXP¶´ ZKLFK VKRXOG DLG -XVWLFHV LQ DFKLHYLQJ
³SULQFLSOHGFRQVLVWHQF\´LQFRQVWLWXWLonal decision-making.48 The widespread adoption of 
WKLV WKHRU\ KH VD\V ³ZRXOG XQGRXEWHGO\ UHTXLUH VLJQLILFDQW UHYLVLRQV LQ RXU H[LVWLQJ
FRQVWLWXWLRQDOSUDFWLFH´ LQ WKDW LW OHDGV WRZKDW KHFDOOV WKH³VWDUWOLQJO\FRXQWHULQWXLWLYH
FRQFOXVLRQ´ WKDW ³FRPPLWPHnts to interpretive methodologies are and ought to be 
UHYLVDEOH WKRXJKVXEMHFWWRWKHGHPDQGVDQGGLVFLSOLQHRIJRRGIDLWK´49 This theory is 
EHWWHUWKDQWKHRWKHUWKHRULHVKHDUJXHVEHFDXVHLW³FDSWXUHVWKHDSSURSULDWHUHODWLRQVKLS
between theory and case-by-case practice in the quest for moral and legal legitimacy in 
FRQVWLWXWLRQDODGMXGLFDWLRQ´50
,Q KLV ILQDO FKDSWHU 3URIHVVRU )DOORQ FRQFOXGHV QRQH WRR FOHDUO\ WKDW ³WKH
conjunction of democracy in constitutional interpretation with sharp ideological division 
in politics has produced, or at least threatens to generate, serious grounds for forward-
looking worry about the legitimacy of constitutional adjudication by the Supreme Court, 
DWOHDVWLQWKHVRFLRORJLFDODQGXOWLPDWHO\LQWKHPRUDOVHQVH´51 In response to this worry, 
)DOORQRIIHUV WZRVXJJHVWLRQV)LUVWXQGHU WKHKHDGLQJ³7KH&DVH IRU*UHDWHU µ-XGLFLDO
5HVWUDLQW¶´ KH DUJXHV WKDW EHFDXVH ³&RQJUHVV DQG WKH VWDWH OHJLVODWXUHV KDYH FODLPV WR
moral and political legitimacy that arise from their demRFUDWLF DFFRXQWDELOLW\´ FRXUWV
VKRXOGEH³UHOXFWDQ>W@ WRUHMHFWDVXQFRQVWLWXWLRQDOOHJLVODWLRQWKDW&RQJUHVVRUWKHVWDWH
OHJLVODWXUHVKDYHSUHVXPDEO\DGMXGJHGWREHFRQVWLWXWLRQDOO\YDOLG´52 He believes that in 
³DVXEVWDQWLDO IUDFWLRQRIWKHFDVHVLQZKLFKWKH-XVWLFHVLQYDOLGDWH>G@OHJLVODWLRQ´WKHLU
LQWHUYHQWLRQZDVXQZDUUDQWHGDQGWKDWWKH-XVWLFHVFRXOGDFKLHYH³DPRUHDSSURSULDWHO\
UHVWUDLQHG DSSURDFK´ E\ DGRSWLQJ KLV 5HIOHFWLYH (TXLOLEULXP 7KHRU\ RI FRQVWLWXWLRQDO
interpretation.53
Professor Fallon¶V VHFRQG VXJJHVWLRQ IRU OHVVHQLQJ WKHZRUU\ DERXW WKH 6XSUHPH
&RXUW OHJLWLPDF\ LV WKH DGRSWLRQ RI ³&KDQJLQJ1RUPV RI WKH -XGLFLDO1RPLQDWLRQ DQG
&RQILUPDWLRQ´54 +HEHOLHYHVWKDWEHFDXVHWKH&RXUW³KDVFRPHWRSOD\DQLQFUHDVLQJO\
prominent and ideologicalO\LQIOHFWHGUROHLQRXUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOVFKHPH´WKHQRPLQDWLRQ
and confirmation of Justices have FRPH WREHYLHZHGDV ³PDWWHUVRIKLJKSROLWLFDODQG
VRPHWLPHV SDUWLVDQ FRQVHTXHQFH´ OHDGLQJ WR ³VFKHPLQJ SRVWXULQJ DQG
JDPHVPDQVKLS´55 +HUHFRPPHQGVWKDWSUHVLGHQWVDQGVHQDWRUV³DJUHHRQDQGDELGHE\
SULQFLSOHVRIPRGHUDWLRQ´GHILQHGDV³OHJDODQGSROLWLFDOFHQWULVP´56 While he claims to 
UHMHFW WKH ³UXOH RI FOHDU PLVWDNH´ KH UHSHDWV WKDW WKH &RXUW VKRXOG QRW ³IUXVWUDWH WKH
operation of the political process by invalidating legislation adopted by institutions with 
                                                          
 48. Id. at 143. 
 49. Id. at 147±48. 
 50. Id. at 154. 
 51. FALLON, supra note 1, at 157±58. 
 52. Id. at 159. 
 53. Id. at 164. 
 54. Id. at 165. 
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PRUHDXWKRULW\ WR OLPLWGHPRFUDWLFGHFLVLRQPDNLQJ WKDQ WKH\ VKRXOG´EHFDXVHRI WKHLU




that the Justices generally apply consistent decision-making premises from one case to the 
next, but that they tend to deviate when necessary to reach what they regard as morally 
and practically desirable outcomes in high-VWDNHVFDVHV´60 %\³>H@VFKHZLQJWRRPDQ\WRR
ULJLGDGYDQFHFRPPLWPHQWV´WKH5HIOHFWLve Equilibrium Hypothesis allows the Justices 
WRUHDFK³LGHRORJLFDOO\FRQJHQLDOUHVXOWVLQDVXEVWDQWLDOIUDFWLRQRIEXWQRWDOOFDVHV´61
This apparently would be enough to show that the Court is subject to some constraint and 
therefore not a lawless political institution. Its adoption by the Justices, Fallon concludes, 
³FRXOGGRDJUHDWGHDOWRHQKDQFHWKHPRUDOOHJLWLPDF\RIFRQVWLWXWLRQDODGMXGLFDWLRQLQ
WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW´62
,W LV GLIILFXOW WR LPDJLQH D ³PHWKRGRORJLFDO´ FRQFOXVLRQ OHVV OLNHO\ WR KDYH Dny 
practical effect. The Cynical Realists are surely correct that methodology is much less 
important in Supreme Court constitutional decision-making than Professor Fallon 
assumes. His Reflective Equilibrium Theory is, virtually by definition, much too vague 
DQGXQFHUWDLQWREHXVHIXO0RUHLPSRUWDQWWKHEDVLFSUREOHPZLWK)DOORQ¶VDSSURDFKDV
ZLWKDOOOLYLQJ&RQVWLWXWLRQWKHRULHVRI³LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ´LVWKDWLWDVVXPHVFRQWUDU\WRWKH
theory of judicial review and without historical support or argument, that the Court ought 
to invalidate as unconstitutional policy choices made in the ordinary political process on 
moral as well as legal grounds, effectively rewriting the Constitution by adding 
prohibitions of disfavored policies. The only way that the Court can enhance the 
legitimacy, moral or otherwise, of its constitutional adjudication is by confining itself to 
invalidating as unconstitutional only those legislative policy choices that the Constitution 
actually prohibits. 
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 59. Id. at 169, 171. 
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